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The US decided last month to abandon its threat of economic reprisals against Costa Rica for having
agreed to a quota arrangement for the export of bananas to the European Union (EU). Colombia,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela also agreed to the quota system, but the US has concentrated its fire
mostly on Costa Rica. The banana controversy dates from a December 1992 decision by the EU then
still the European Economic Community to set maximum tonnage restrictions on the importation of
bananas shipped from Latin America and the US. The system imposes excessive tariffs on banana
imports when they surpass a pre-established limit. The limits, which took effect in July 1993, are
aimed at reserving a share of the European banana market for producers in former European
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific region (ACP).
Under the system, non-ACP producers are allowed to import up to 2.56 million metric tons of
bananas per year at a preferential customs duty of US$123.60 per MT. Beyond the maximum
tonnage, however, the duty leaps to US$1,050.60 per MT (see NotiSur, 03/05/93, 06/10/93, and
07/08/93). Until now, the EU market had been lucrative for Latin American banana producers
because prices for the product are much higher there than in other large markets such as the US.
Based on 1992 export figures, the eight Latin American banana-exporting nations members of the
Union de Paises Exportadores de Banano (UPEB) estimate they are losing US$350 million per year as
a direct result of the EU tonnage restriction.
Already, an estimated 600,000 MT of bananas from Latin America have been kept out of the EU
market. Unsold supply has induced some growers to cut back the expensive process of maintaining
their fields against crop diseases, or even to abandon production altogether. The glut has saddled
producing countries with an unmarketable supply which cannot all be profitably sold in the US,
where traditionally low prices for bananas have been further lowered by oversupply. Despite a
nonbinding opinion by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in May 1993 which
stated that the EU restrictions violated the principle of free trade agreed on during the 1993 Uruguay
Round of talks the EU has shown no willingness to revoke its policy.
As an alternative, the EU offered guaranteed quotas to Latin American banana exporters, in effect
dividing up the maximum import tonnage for non-ACP countries to more equitably distribute
the 2.56 million MT import ceiling among those nations that agree to negotiate with the EU. The
alternative quota agreement with the EU went into effect on April 1, and essentially is a way for the
four countries who accepted the offer to avoid open competition for the limited banana imports
permitted into the EU. Costa Rica's quota is 23.4% of the allotted maximum tonnage, Colombia gets
22%, Venezuela 2%, and Nicaragua 3%. All other non-ACP producers must openly compete for
the remaining 49.6%, since they did not negotiate individual quotas with the EU. In return for the
quotas, Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela agreed not to pursue with the World Trade
Organization their complaint against the EU for its restrictive import policy.
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Unlike those four nations, Ecuador which is the world's largest banana exporter and other Latin
American producers have refused to accept the EU quota system, opting instead to fight the tonnage
restrictions under free-trade principles. Costa Rica readily admits that the quota system is an unfair
trade practice but argues that acceptance of the quota was the only way to protect its trade. Costa
Rica is the world's second largest producer of bananas, behind Ecuador. Banana exports are the
country's leading earner of foreign exchange and account for 20% of its exports. In 1994, banana
exports earned US$560 million, and approximately 150,000 workers depend directly or indirectly on
the industry for their livelihood.
The short-term damage to Costa Rica's economy from the EU policy is estimated at US$119 million
in lost export earnings and 9,000 lost jobs. But, in the longer term, the export restriction could
dramatically alter the economic relations between growers and the large exporting corporations, and
permanently reshape the industry. The EU restriction also damages transnational corporations such
as Chiquita Brands International, Standard Fruit, and Del Monte, which dominate the distribution of
bananas. Chiquita Brands, though a minor producer in Costa Rica, is an important distributor of the
product. The company reported losses in its Latin American operations during 1994 of nearly US$72
million, because of a number of factors including strikes in Honduras and crop diseases.
A company spokesperson blamed much of the loss as well on the world price decline resulting from
the EU restrictions. In fact, worse than lower prices is Chiquita's direct loss of EU market share.
The company's owner, Carl Lindner, made large investments in the EU to enhance the company's
position in the market, which before the EU banana import restrictions took effect took up to 87% of
its shipments. But, with the introduction of the tonnage restriction, the company lost half of its EU
market share. Furthermore, without a larger portion of the Costa Rican export quota, it is unlikely
to regain it. Because of new licensing procedures, growth in Chiquita's distribution of Costa Rican
bananas has halted.
Before the maximum tonnage system took effect, the EU allowed transnational distributors to
handle all banana import licenses, and the multinationals therefore controlled the decisions over
the amount that domestic producers in Latin American countries would contribute to the total that a
given company exported to the EU. Under the quota agreement, however, the EU turned over to the
governments of the four participating countries the right to distribute 70% of the EU import licenses,
leaving only 30% of the contracts in the hands of the transnationals. In Colombia, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela the transnational corporations that dominate distribution received the lion's share of
the licenses. Costa Rica, however, chose to distribute its licenses equally among its suppliers, both
national and transnational.
Equal access to EU import licenses reduces Chiquita's power to set the price it pays to local growers.
In fact, under the quota system, Costa Rica suppliers are getting more per box than the transnational
distributors were paying. By comparison, in Panama, which has no guaranteed quota, growers found
that after the quota went into effect they were getting a lower price than before. Growers there
are complaining that Chiquita Brands is using the EU restrictions as a excuse to pay less and drive
independent growers out of business. Chiquita's response to the new export obstacles was to begin
a campaign in Washington DC to pressure the EU to rescind its policy.
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 4

LADB Article Id: 56070
ISSN: 1060-4189

In January, US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor complained on behalf of the company and
the Hawaiian Banana Industry Association that the EU's restrictions violated US trade laws. This
opened the possibility that the US would invoke trade sanctions under Section 301 of the US Trade
Act, which requires the US to retaliate if unfair trade practices are found to injure US businesses.
The EU so far has not backed down under threats of retaliation by the US. Furthermore, the US
has no recourse under the grievance procedures of the World Trade Organization. This is because
the EU restriction on banana imports is legal under GATT, since the US agreed to the preferential
treatment of ACP bananas at the Uruguay Round in 1993.
Unable to make headway against the EU, Kantor began threatening Costa Rica with sanctions under
Section 301 for compliance with the quota agreement. According to Costa Rican officials, Kantor
also asked the government to award more EU import licenses to Chiquita Brands at the expense
of local suppliers. US relations with Costa Rica have been clouded for some time because of two
outstanding indemnity claims against the Costa Rican government for property losses one by a US
telecommunications firm that lost its contract to do business in Costa Rica, and the other by a US
citizen whose land was appropriated for a national park (see NotiSur, 05/25/95). With the addition of
the issue of banana quotas, US Ambassador to Costa Rica Peter Jon de Vos said on March 24 that the
foreign investment climate in the country had deteriorated because of Costa Rica's failure to satisfy
the US on these issues. Foreign Trade Minister Jose Rossi described Costa Rica's situation in the
banana dispute as "like a hostage in the middle of a conflict that we have no power to resolve, but as
the weakest party, we are getting the most pressure."
Chiquita Brands stepped up the pressure on Costa Rica on April 8, by breaking its contract with
the government to buy 75,000 boxes of bananas weekly from the national suppliers organization
(Corporacion Bananera Nacional, CORBANA). Chiquita explained that it broke the agreement
because CORBANA was not delivering the agreed amount of bananas. According to Rossi, the
suspension of purchases forced CORBANA to lay off 700 workers and left it with no way to market
the unsold stock. CORBANA'S losses in turn forced many growers to suspend production for
the rest of the year. Chiquita's strategy, says Cristobal Jenkins, manager of Costa Rica's state-run
independent producers association DIFRUSA, was to force the smaller growers out of business by
refusing to buy from them. "[Chiquita Brands] has serious financial problems," said Jenkins, "and
its reaction is to try to eliminate the independent producers and save itself." Whereas before, said
Jenkins, the company could manipulate supply, shifting its purchases to countries with the lowest
prices, under the licensing system, growers have a guaranteed share of the export business. For
several months, the US and Costa Rica wrangled over whether Costa Rica's agreement to accept the
EU quota system is a violation of US trade laws.
Finally, Rossi reached an understanding with US trade officials on May 18 to set up a group
composed of representatives from Colombia, Costa Rica, and the US to study proposals to resolve
the quota issue. This action marked a US retreat from the strategy of attacking Costa Rica's
acceptance of the EU quotas as an unfair trade practice. Instead, the US unofficially adopted Costa
Rica's argument that it was the EU's system of giving preferential entry into its market to the ACP
growers that was unfair. Chiquita Brands promptly reversed course as well, promising on May
24 to resume purchase of bananas from Costa Rican growers, though only 45,000 boxes per week.
CORBANA was able to contract with Standard Fruit to take an additional 11,000 boxes.
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Meanwhile, at a meeting in Brussels, on May 22, Kantor and EU trade representative Sir Leon
Brittan agreed to avoid a trade war by negotiating an end to the banana crisis, among other trade
matters, during the next several weeks. So far, the EU has only offered to make adjustments, such as
raising the banana import limit for non-ACP nations to 3 million MT. Should the US agree, however,
it would amount to de facto acceptance of the EU's right to engage in restrictive trade practices,
undermining any future arguments against similar policies. (Sources: Agencia Centroamericana
de Noticias Spanish News Service, 09/23/93; New York Times, 01/29/95; Journal of Commerce,
02/15/95 04/13/95, 05/02/95; Inter Press Service, 05/17/95; Agence France-Presse, 01/17/95, 04/24/95,
05/18/95; Notimex, 03/29/95, 04/05/95, 04/16/95, 04/27/95, 05/22/95; Associated Press, 05/27/95; Reuter,
06/05/95)
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